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Comments on how Browning, Chiappori and Weiss' (2014) book *Economics of the Family* misrepresent my modeling of marriage

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Browning, Chiappori and Weiss (hence BCW) discuss my models of marriage under a subtitle 'equilibrium models' (p. 128 of the printed book). I appreciate that my models are mentioned right after Becker's seminal models, but would like to point out that the paragraph they wrote about my work is loaded with inaccuracies.

A. They state:

"Following the seminal contributions of Becker, several papers by Grossbard-Schechtman [footnote 24: See Grossbard-Schechtman 1993 for a unified presentation] analyze marriage in a general equilibrium framework, in which intrahousehold allocations are directly driven by the competitive constraints that exist on the marriage market."

Major comments on A

1/ It is wrong to categorize my 1984 theoretical model as a general equilibrium model. It does contain a general equilibrium element as it also analyzes the mutual relationships between standard labor markets and marriage markets modeled as markets for work in household production. My model's micro basis consists of individual utility functions and budget constraints that are not so different from those of the collective models, older bargaining models or the separate sphere model. Individuals are in the market for a match. They may bargain with potential candidates, or once they have found a match they may bargain with their husband, wife, or partner, over how much to produce and how much to pay. As do more conventional labor market models my models have features of non-cooperative bargaining and of cooperative market equilibrium that reaches efficiency.

2/ by writing 'on THE marriage market' BCW only recognize the macro side of my theory, in which there is just one marriage market. However, my theory also has multiple marriage markets, defined for heterogeneous male and female participants, and competitive constraints establish prices in all these markets. This has parallels in labor economics, where most economic analyses recognize the presence of multiple labor markets. Labor economics is generally considered as part of micro economics, and my analyses of marriage markets also belong there.

3/ footnote 24 in BCW is wrong. Grossbard-Schechtman 1993 is not a unified presentation, nor does it claim to be. It is a collection of articles. It includes e.g. a chapter (chapter 7 "Compensating differentials in marriage and married women's labor supply", co-authored with Shoshana Neuman) adapted from an article published in the JPE in 1988. It applies the theory to a comparison of the labor supply of women differing in ethnicity and married to men differing in ethnicity. How can BCW characterize that as general equilibrium?

- B. BCW state: “In some of these models, the women’s role is essentially to produce domestic commodities. Men employ women to produce for them, and compensate them with transfers (which, in developing societies, may take the form of provision of basic needs) and/or non-pecuniary benefits. From this perspective, marriage can essentially be analyzed as an employment relationship, which allows to apply the standard concepts of labor economics. The framework is then generalized to situations where both men and women engage in household production work.”

Major comments on B:

The only article in Grossbard-Shechtman 1993 that assumes only women do the household production is Chapter 11 based my 1976 article published in *Current Anthropology* and applied to a society where men really did not do any household production. Most of the chapters deal with women also in the labor force and does not make assumptions regarding the amount of household production that men do. In any event, my models at least have agents who devote time to household production. In basic the collective model presented in BCW (p. 164) there is home production without time inputs!

- C. “In all these models, the emphasis is put on a general equilibrium analysis, and specifically on the impact of the economy on intrahousehold decisions.”

Major comments on C:

No, the emphasis in my work is NOT on general equilibrium analysis. A major theme of my work has been to compare outcomes for individuals participating in different markets, which is typically what micro-economists do. I have written very little on the impact of the economy on intrahousehold decisions. To say that I have emphasized it is totally inaccurate.

- D. “One may remark at this stage that the outcome of the decision process thus described is efficient; therefore these models belong to the cooperative/collective family. [footnote 25: The relationship between intrahousehold decision processes in a collective framework and equilibrium on the market for marriage will be the main topic of the second part of the present book.]

Major comments on D:

They elaborate on the relationship between intrahousehold decision processes and equilibrium on the market for marriage over almost 200 pages (second part of their book). In those pages they don’t mention my work at all. For example, even though they include an extensive coverage of how sex ratios in marriage markets affect intrahousehold decision processes they fail to mention that the first economics article to elaborate on how sex ratios may influence individual labor supply is my article in *Economic Journal*, Grossbard-Shechtman (1984). I was also the first to elaborate on how a variety of outcomes of household decisions may be affected by sex ratios (see Chapter

4 in Grossbard-Shechtman 1993). Even though the collective model they use first assumes that two individuals become a collective and then distribute goods amongst them, whereas I assume that the individuals are independent decision-makers like firms and workers, we reach many of the same testable insights. However, I came up with them first.

In conclusion, if anyone wants to know all the pages in BCW where there should be a reference to my work, I will make the effort of pointing that out. I am stopping here. It took me 6 years to write these comments. I found it emotionally draining to tell economists associated with major universities—Columbia, Chicago, Paris School of Economics, Oxford, and Tel-Aviv—that they are fundamentally wrong in their treatment of my work. Now that this has been done, it may not take as long to go through Part II of BCW and point where these esteemed authors unfairly ignored my models.

Minor comments

They misspell my former name Shechtman