

Nobel prize winners about Grossbard's theory (including Grossbard-Shechtman 1984):

James Heckman (won in 2000)

In Killingsworth, Mark R. and Heckman, James J. (1986) Female Labor Supply: a Survey in *Handbook of Labor Economics* Vol 1, edited by O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, Elsevier.

After reviewing Becker's models and bargaining models of family behavior Killingsworth and Heckman include this in footnote 6 p. 132): "...Grossbard-Shechtman (1984) adopts an individual utility function whose arguments include household time supplied by other persons and a budget constraint specifying that expenditures on market goods *produced* (sic) and on time supplied by other *persons* (sic) may not exceed the sum of nonwage income, earnings from market work and earnings from supplying household time to other *individuals* (sic). Pay for market work w and implicit *prices* (sic) of household time p^* that the individual receives from or supplies to others are determined in labor and marriage markets, respectively; changes in exogeneous factors (e.g. the relative size of the male or female population) affect marriage markets, the relative magnitudes and absolute levels of w and the p^* and, thus, labor supply decisions and marriage rates."

Joshua Angrist (won in 2021)

in [How do sex ratios affect marriage and labor markets? Evidence from America's second generation](#) QJE (2002)

"Attempting to integrate the theories of marriage and labor markets more fully, Grossbard-Shechtman [1984] argued that spouses can be viewed as providing a type of home-production for which there are market substitutes. In her framework, an increase in sex ratios increases the demand for wives' spousal labor. This increases the shadow wage for home production, thereby reducing female labor force participation outside the home. In principle, changing wages for home production may affect labor supply by unmarried women as well, since unmarried women in a high-sex-ratio environment should respond to the increased demand for spousal labor by marrying sooner and investing less in skills valued outside the home." (...)

"The Becker, Grossbard-Shechtman, and bargaining theories have similar implications, with the mechanism of increased bargaining power for women a common theme." He also cites two of my empirical studies: "Grossbard-Shechtman [1985, 1993] studied links between sex ratios and female labor supply in cities, as well as effects on marriage rates."

Endorsements of my work by Nobel prize winners

Gary Becker (won in 1992)

"You have done and are still doing important work on economic aspects of marriage and the family." (letter sent Feb 14, 1994) [add link to the letter]

T.W. Schultz (won in 1979)

“Your professorship is an occasion for joy. I like especially your paper on interaction between Marriage Development and your Survey.” (letter sent May 30, 1990) [add link to letter]

About my 1993 book *On the Economics of Marriage*: “This book is a major advance in knowledge pertaining to the economics of marriage. The rationale in support of various institutional constraints have long been neglected. Grossbard-Shechtman comes to grips with polygamy as an institution. The old institutions of levirate, patrilineality, and dowry still matter.” (back cover of original edition) [add link]

James Heckman (won in 2000)

In 1997 James Heckman recommended to the editors of *J of Economic Perspectives* that I write a survey article on economics of marriage (it did not work out for various reasons).

Chapter 2

FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY: A SURVEY

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1. Introduction

This chapter surveys theoretical and empirical work on the labor supply of women, with special reference to women in Western economies, primarily the United States, in modern times.¹ The behavior of female labor supply has important implications for many other phenomena, including marriage, fertility, divorce, the distribution of family earnings and male-female wage differentials. The labor supply of women is also of interest because of the technical questions it poses. For example, since many women do not work, corner solutions are at least potentially a very important issue in both the theoretical and empirical analysis of female labor supply, even though in other contexts (e.g. studies of consumer demand) corner solutions are often ignored. [For recent discussions of this issue

*We thank Ricardo Barros, Bo Honoré, Tom Mroz and John Pencavel for invaluable comments and suggestions; Wolfgang Franz, Heather Joshi and Alice and Masao Nakamura for help in assembling data on the "stylized facts" about female labor supply presented in Section 2; Eileen Funck and Paul Rabideau for research assistance; and Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard for patience.

¹For a general overview of women in the U.S. labor market, see Smith, ed. (1979); Fuchs (1984), Goldin (1980, 1983a, 1983b, 1984, 1986), Goldin and Sokoloff (1982) and Smith and Ward (1984a, 1984b) discuss historical and recent trends. The collection of papers in Layard and Mincer (1984), includes work on female labor supply in Australia, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. See also Joshi (1985), Joshi and Owen (1984, 1985), and Martin and Roberts (1984) on Britain; Nakamura and Nakamura (1981), Nakamura, Nakamura and Cullen (1979), Smith and Stelcner (1985), Stelcner and Breslaw (1985), Stelcner and Smith (1985) and Robinson and Tomes (1985) on Canada; Franz (1981) and Franz and Kawasaki (1981) on the Federal Republic of Germany; Bourguignon (1985) on France; Hill (1983, 1984, 1985), Yamada and Yamada (1984, 1985) and Yamada, Yamada and Chaloupka (1985) on Japan; and Kapteyn, Kooreman and van Soest (1985), Kooreman and Kapteyn (1984a, 1985), Renaud and Siegers (1984) and van der Veen and Evers (1984) on the Netherlands.

Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume I, Edited by O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard
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