Shoshana Grossbard | Economics of the Family and the Household

Research Themes

Some of the major themes I have addressed in my research

SOME MAJOR RESEARCH THEMES I HAVE ADDRESSED IN MY RESEARCH.

1/ FIRST NON-COOPERATIVE MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING WITHIN HOUSEHOLDS (HHS):

Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labor and Marriage," Economic Journal, 94(4): 863-882, December 1984. Explanatory notes. A more complete conceptual framework can be found in Chapter 2 of my 2015 book The Marriage Motive https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9781461416227. (Consider just ordering chapters 2 and 3 if you don’t want to read the whole book).

This is a unique model that has each person, male or female, make their own decisions on how to allocate their time and other resources. The concept of Work-In-HOusehold (WIHO) helps coordinate the decisions of men and women (in the case of heterosexual couples). “The concept of Work-in-Household (WIHO) facilitates the application of labor market analysis to marital firms (in Grossbard (1976) and Heer and Grossbard-Shechtman (1981) I used the more limited term “wife-services”). WIHO is defined as a service that is of benefit to one spouse (for example, the wife) but involves an opportunity cost on the part of the spouse supplying the service (for example, the husband).  Demand for WIHO is similar to the demand for labor. The more productive the WIHO-worker and the more valuable the product of WIHO to the (potential) beneficiary, the higher the demand. Supply of WIHO is similar to the supply of other types of labor: it is upward-sloping and shifts as a function of the characteristics of both worker and ‘job’ (which includes characteristics of the spouse or potential spouse). Marriage markets are markets for WIHO in which demand and supply interact. There are multiple marriage markets for various types of WIHO workers differentiated by education, ethnicity, age, etc. [from chapter for volume A Cultural History of Marriage, forthcoming, Bloomsbury,]

As stated in my JPE article applying the theory: “the share of household income going to a particular spouse, and consequently that spouse's value of time, can vary with circumstances specific to a marriage or a marriage market. It follows that any trait of the wife or husband associated with a higher wife's share of household income also implies a higher value of time and therefore a lower likelihood that she participates in the labor force. Formally, w* is viewed as a function w* = k . I,where w* is the value of time of a spouse, I is a vector of household income sources other than that spouse's income from work, and k is the proportion of such income that spouse obtains for her own benefit. We are assuming that spouses' well-being depends on the extent to which they control the household's income.”

SOME OF THE MODEL’S IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDY of LABOR SUPPLY For instance:

(1) studies of women’s labor force participation and sex ratio; (PROPOSITION: women are more likely to be active in the labor force if they face lower sex ratios). This was tested in the context of the USA, by cohort or across cities;

(2) women’s labor force participation: value of different ethnic affiliations and age differences. Applied to data from Israel and Hawaii (Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Xuanning Fu. "Women's Labor Force Participation and Status Exchange in Intermarriage: An Empirical Study in Hawaii", Journal of Bioeconomics, 4(3): 241-268, 2002.)

(3) Shoshana Grossbard and Victoria Vernon. "Common Law Marriage and Male/Female Convergence in Labor Supply and Time Use", Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 41 on Gender Convergence in the Labor Market, pp. 143-175, 2015.

A more complete list of my work on labor supply can be found here: https://econoflove.sdsu.edu/research_topics.html#labor

MODEL’S IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDY OF HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION

   Time in household production and Racial Intermarriage (Shoshana Grossbard, Jose Ignacio Gimenez and Jose Alberto Molina. "Racial Intermarriage and Household Production", Review of Behavioral Economics, 1(4):295-347, 2014.)

For more of my articles on household production click here:Household Production, including Time in Household Production

MODEL’S OTHER IMPLICATIONS (examples)

              **  idea that women’s autonomy and decision-making power in their households is a function of what affects value in marriage markets, including sex ratios and laws related to marriage (see Chapter 4 in   Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, On the Economics of Marriage - A Theory of Marriage, Labor and Divorce.  Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1993.

** Whose time? Who saves? Introduction to a special issue on couples’ savings, time use and children w Elena Stancanelli. ” Review of Economics of the Household, 8(3):289-296, September 2010


2/ ELDERCARE AND MARRIAGE

An Extended Household Model of Eldercare by Children and Children-In-Law based on Far-Eastern Traditions." Review of Development Economics 22(3):1022-1038, August 2018

3/ SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF THE ECONOMICS PROFESSION

NEW WORKING PAPER ON GENDER GAP IN CITATIONS: female authors get cited 24% more than male authors; sample: articles in J of Population Economics and Review of Economics of the Household, two journals in Demographic Economics. Working paper WP 18-078 with HCEO (University of Chicago) . Older publications on this theme can be found on this page on this website: https://www.econoflove.com/research-fields (last category: History of Economic Thought)

4/ RACE, ETHNICITY, CULTURE AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE

“Racial Intermarriage and Household Production”, Review of Behavioral Economics 1(4):295-347, 2014. (w. Jose Ignacio Gimenez and Jose Alberto Molina.)

Ronald Mincy, Shoshana Grossbard, and Chien-Chung Huang, May 2005."An Economic Analysis of Co-Parenting Choices: Single Parent, Visiting Father, Cohabitation, Marriage" Ms, Columbia University 

Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Shoshana Neuman. "The Extra Burden of Moslem Wives: Clues from Israeli Women's Labor Supply," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 46: 491-518, April 1998.

chapter on Jewish/Gentile intermarriage in Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, On the Economics of Marriage - A Theory of Marriage, Labor and Divorce.  Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1993.

5/ HOW MARRIAGE-RELATED FACTORS, INCLUDING FAMILY LAWS, AFFECT LABOR SUPPLY AND WAGES

other articles examining the association between marriage markets and labor supply:

Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Xuanning Fu. "Women's Labor Force Participation and Status Exchange in Intermarriage: An Empirical Study in Hawaii", Journal of Bioeconomics, 4(3): 241-268, 2002.

Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Shoshana Neuman. "The Extra Burden of Moslem Wives: Clues from Israeli Women's Labor Supply," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 46: 491-518, April 1998.

Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Matthew Neideffer. "Women's Hours of Work and Marriage Market Imbalances," in Economics of the Family and Family Policies, edited by Inga Persson and Christina Jonung, London: Routledge, 1997. 

many chapters in Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, On the Economics of Marriage - A Theory of Marriage, Labor and Divorce.  Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1993.

Marriage markets as explanation for why heavier people work more hours.” With Sankar Mukhopadhyay. IZA Journal of Labor Economics, 6:9 DOI 10.1186/s40172-017-0059-y 2017

Common Law Marriage and Male/Female Convergence in Labor Supply and Time Use”, Research in Labor Economics, Volume on Gender Convergence in the Labor Market, 41: 143-175, 2015. (w. Victoria Vernon.)

More older articles on such themes can be found here: https://www.econoflove.com/research-fields, click on second category (labor economics)

6/ MARITAL VERSUS NON-MARITAL FERTILITY, MARRIAGE MARKETS, and LAWS

Proposition 6.1: Women are more likely to have a child out of marriage (couple) if laws make it less beneficial to be a married (coupled) vs an unmarried (uncoupled) mother  (does not follow from other household economics models assuming couples make fertility decisions)

              **tested in the context of 19th Century US: “Single Motherhood and the Abolition of Coverture in the United StatesJournal of Empirical Legal Studies 16:1, (with Hazem Alshaikhmubarak and Richard Geddes), March 2019. 
              ** tested in the context of 17 different legal regimes; contemporary Western world : Does community property discourage unpartnered births (with Olivia Ekert-Jaffe) European J of Political Economy 24(1):25-40, 2008.
              ** tested in the context of states in the USA, recent data, "Common Law Marriage and Teen Births" J of Family and Economic Issues 38(1): 129–145, 2017. (with Victoria Vernon)

6.2 OTHER WRITINGS RELATED TO CHOICE OF RELATIONSHIP (COUPLE? MARRIED? SINGLE?) AND FERTILITY

** “Women's Labor Supply, Marriage, and Welfare Dependency,Labour 19:211-241, 2005.

**Ronald Mincy, Shoshana Grossbard and Chien-Chung Huang "An Economic Analysis of Co-Parenting Choices: Single Parent, Visiting Father, Cohabitation, Marriage", EconWPA papers in Labor and Demography #0505004, May 2005.

**Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "Economic Behavior, Marriage and Fertility: Two Lessons from Polygyny," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7:415-424, 1986.

** Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "Marriage Squeezes, Cohabitation, and the Feminist Revolution” in Contemporary Marriage: Comparative Perspectives on a Changing Institution ed. by Kingsley Davis in association with Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman, New York: Russell Sage Publications, 1985.

**Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "A Theory of Marriage Formality: The Case of Guatemala," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 30(4): 813-830, 1982.

**David M. Heer and Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "The Impact of the Female Marriage Squeeze and the Contraceptive Revolution on Sex Roles and the Women's Liberation Movement in the United States, 1960 to 1975," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 43(1): 49-65, 1981.

More articles on the determinants of Marriage, Cohabitation, and Fertility (Demographic Economics) can be found in the fourth category here: https://www.econoflove.com/research-fields

7/ Macro-Economics (Production, Consumption, Savings, Household) [click for a list of all my publications on these themes]

8/Health Economics and Economics of Risky Behavior (Obesity, Teen Sex, Long-Term Care)

9/ Consumer Economics

10/Economics of Happiness

11/Public Policy and Governance

12/Economics of Religion

13/ Law and Economics of Marriage, Divorce, and Parenting

14/Inter-Disciplinary